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The problem with commercial surrogacy. 
A reflection on reproduction, markets and labour 
Lorenzo Del Savio, Giulia Cavaliere 
ABSTRACT: Moral arguments pertaining to commercial surrogate pregnancy have been 
framed as questions on the appropriate scope of markets. Should pregnancies be 
conceived and regulated as services that can be exchanged in markets? It has been 
argued that surrogacy is an exceptional form of labour, and hence inappropriately 
commodified, because of its nature. Commercial surrogacy involves the bodies and 
identities of women in a most invasive manner, it negatively affects motherhood and 
it inappropriately treats babies and surrogates as commodities. We find these argu-
ments wanting: the nature of gestational surrogacy does not make it an exceptional 
form of labour, and indeed the commodification of pregnancy may disrupt oppres-
sive conceptions of human reproduction. We argue instead that surrogacy does raise 
major moral concerns insofar as it may exacerbate extant patterns of domination and 
exploitation based on international inequities and gender-based discrimination. 
However, the moral problems of surrogacy extend to wage labour more generally. In 
other words, surrogate pregnancy is not an exceptional form of labour, but human 
labour is an exceptional commodity. 
KEYWORDS: Surrogacy; Market; Labour; Commodification; Freedom. 
SUMMARY: 1. Surrogacy and the future of human reproduction. - 2. Altruistic surrogacy vs. the market. – 3.The 
debate on the scope of markets. - 4. The pro-commodification presumption: welfare, knowledge, liberty. – 5. 
Pregnancy is special. – 6. Labour is special. – 7. Conclusions. 
1. Surrogacy and the future of human reproduction 
ertilisations, pregnancies and upbringings are necessary activities for the continuation of 
human society through the production of new individuals, i.e. biological reproduction. Such 
reproductive activities have been organised in different manners in different times and 
places, and indeed, reproductive relationships have been a key topic of comparative anthropology 
ever since its foundation1. In several contemporary societies, institutions such as health systems, 
families and schooling orchestrate reproduction within human groups, including genetic relatives, 
broader kinship groups and the larger society. In some contexts, reproductive services have been, as 
                                                          
∗ Lorenzo Del Savio: Research Fellow, Division of Biomedical Ethics, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel; Giulia 
Cavaliere: PhD Candidate, Department of Social Science, Health & Medicine, King’s College London. Essay se-
lected by the Steering Committee among submissions to the Call for papers on Surrogacy. 
1
 Systems of kinship are a major research topic of early anthropological studies starting with L.H. MORGAN, 
Systems of consanguinity and affinity of the human family, Vol. 218, Washington, 1871. 
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it were, outsourced: in societies that have abolished slavery this essentially means that reproductive 
services can be purchased and exchanged in markets. Along with families, schools and health sys-
tems, markets have become another institution that organises human reproduction. A relatively new 
development is the emergence of pregnancy markets. 
Since the development of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), it has become possible to disentangle sexual in-
tercourse, genetic parenthood and pregnancy, thus opening up new venues to reshape reproductive 
institutions, including parenthood2. One of the new possibilities that assisted reproduction technolo-
gies have opened allows women to carry a foetus that is not their genetic offspring, or a foetus that 
resulted from the ectopic fertilisation of their gametes. A ‘surrogate’ is a woman that becomes preg-
nant, and carries and delivers a child on behalf of others3. ‘Surrogacy agreements’ establish that the 
pregnant woman will surrender her legal right of motherhood to a third party4.  
Surrogacy agreements can take different forms, including: gestational surrogacy and partial surroga-
cy. Whereas in the former the child is genetically unrelated to the surrogate, in the latter the child is 
the genetic offspring of the surrogate and a donor. Despite some divergences, surrogacy can be 
compared to adoption, with the important difference that the future parents could be the partial or 
full genetic parents of the adopted child, thereby allowing couples that cannot conceive naturally, 
and homosexual couples5, to have genetically related children. This particular use of IVF challenges 
established conceptions regarding parenthood, and has hence attracted considerable attention in 
public debates. Legal cases have arisen concerning the enforceability of surrogacy agreements (e.g. 
The ‘Baby M’ case6 and more recently the case of Baby Gammy7), as several pieces of legislation are 
based on the Roman law principle “Mater semper certa est”, which, until surrogacy, corresponded 
neatly with what was technically feasible8.  
In addition, the technological separation of conception and pregnancy has facilitated the commodifi-
cation of pregnancy. Partial surrogacy was possible before IVF, but IVF allows both gestational surro-
gacy and a thorough isolation of pregnancy from sexual intercourse, thereby easing its commodifica-
tion. Those who find surrogacy unsettling, oscillate between condemning reproductive technologies 
                                                          
2 
C. PALACIOS-GONZÁLEZ, J. HARRIS, G. TESTA, Multiplex parenting: IVG and the generations to come, Journal of 
medical ethics 40/11, 2014, 752-758. 
B. R. SHARMA, Forensic considerations of surrogacy–an overview, Journal of clinical forensic medicine,13/2, 2006, 
80-85. 
3
 F. SHENFIELD, G. PENNINGS, J. COHEN, P. DEVROEY, G. DE WERT, B. TARLATZIS, ESHRE task force on ethics and law 10: 
surrogacy, Human reproduction, 20/10, 2005, 2705-2707. 
4 
Ibidem. 
5
 So far homosexuals can opt for partial surrogacy only, due to technological difficulties in producing artificial 
gametes. However, there have been advancements in cellular reprogramming that may make it possible, see D. 
CYRANOSKI, Rudimentary egg and sperm cells made from stem cells, Nature News, 24/12, 2004, 
doi:10.1038/nature.2014.16636. 
6
 A.L. ALLEN, Privacy, surrogacy, and the Baby M case, The Georgetown Law Review, 76, 1987, 1759-1792. 
D.L. HOFMAN, Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate 
Gender Impact, William Mitchell Law Review, 35/2, 2008, 449-468. 
7 
S. CALLAGHAN, A.J. NEWSON, Surrogacy, motherhood and baby Gammy, Bionews, 766, 2014. 
8 
B.R. SHARMA, op. cit. 
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as such and condemning the resulting commodification9. It is, however, helpful to distinguish be-
tween these two sources of unsettlement. Surrogate pregnancies can be carried out in non-
commercial forms, for instance by a volunteer, who may be a relative or a close friend of the pro-
spective parents. This type of surrogate agreement is called “altruistic surrogacy”. However, it is sur-
rogacy in its “commercial” form that stirs most controversy. Indeed, some legislation treats altruistic 
and commercial surrogacy very differently, and they are generally more restrictive in the case of 
commercial surrogacy10. 
2. Altruistic surrogacy vs. the market 
Italy and the United Kingdom represent interesting examples as Italian and British legislators have 
opted for different types of regulations of surrogate agreements. Whereas in Italy surrogacy is 
banned outright, in the UK altruistic surrogacy is tolerated. In Italy, assisted reproduction services are 
regulated by Law 40 (issued in February 2004)11. Before Law 40, surrogate services were unregulated. 
Paragraph 6 of Article 12 prohibits surrogacy (including altruistic forms of surrogacy) and the com-
mercialisation of embryos and gametes. In addition, the Article establishes a penalty for engaging in 
surrogacy by organising, publicising or undertaking it. In Italy, the penalty amounts to detention from 
three to twenty-four months and a fee from € 600,000 to € 1,000,00012. This legislation echoes Arti-
cle 42 of the Italian Code of Medical Deontology (1998). This Article prohibits, among other services, 
all forms of surrogate pregnancy and the commercialisation of gametes, embryos and foetuses. As a 
consequence, surrogate pregnancy agreements are not considered valid in court, i.e. they are void13. 
In the UK, the legal treatment of surrogate services differs from Italy. The iter legis of surrogacy in 
the UK started in 1982 with the establishment of a committee for the investigation of social, ethical 
and legal questions raised by the development of IVF and the progress of embryology science. The 
committee produced The Warnock Report, named after the committee chair Professor Mary 
Warnock. The Report was published two years later and provided legal basis for what later became 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990)14. The Report illustrates the ethical arguments in 
favour of and against surrogacy and questions concerning parenthood of a child conceived through 
surrogacy. It concludes that the risks for the surrogate mother and the children thus conceived out-
weigh the benefits of this service for infertile couples. Their recommendation at the time was to 
«render criminal the creation or the operation in the United Kingdom of agencies whose purposes 
                                                          
9
 See for instance the position of the Catholic church, which criticises reproductive biotechnologies «for failing 
of accepting and respecting the human condition as it was created» (Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Amoris 
laetitia of the HOLY FATHER FRANCIS, 2016, §56). 
10
 V. KRISHNAN, Attitudes toward surrogate motherhood in Canada, Health Care for Women International, 15/4, 
1994, 333-357. 
11
 L 40/2004 “Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita”. 
12
 L 40/2004 Art. 12.6. 
13
 A.B. FARAONI, La maternità surrogata. La natura del fenomeno, gli aspetti giuridici, le prospettive di disciplina, 
Milano, 2002. 
R. MASTROIANNI IANNI, La surrogazione di maternità: una questione controversa, in Tigor. Rivista di scienze della 
comunicazione e di argomentazione giuridica, 7/1, 2015, 103-119. 
14
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology ("The Warnock Report"), July 1984, Cmnd 9314. 
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include the recruitment of women for surrogate pregnancy or making arrangements for individuals 
or couples who wish to utilise the services of a carrying mother» and to criminalise professionals and 
other people who «knowingly assist in the establishment of a surrogate pregnancy»15. The commit-
tee also maintained that all surrogate agreements should be considered illegal and thus unenforcea-
ble in court. These recommendations were eventually formalised in the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 
of 1985, which regulates gestational surrogacy practices in the UK. The Act criminalised any attempt 
by third parties to initiate, participate, advertise or facilitate payments for surrogate services16. In 
addition, the Act follows the initial position of the Warnock Report: no legally-binding agreements 
can be stipulated in the UK and the surrogate mother has the right to change her mind at any time 
during the pregnancy and after the birth of the child, even when she is not the child’s genetic moth-
er. Parenthood matters in surrogacy agreements are resolved by parental orders. Until the last up-
date to the HFEA Code of Practice (October 2013), if the commissioning parents intended to become 
the legal parents of the child, they either had to adopt the child, or to apply for a parental order to 
reassign the parenthood of the child17. Despite the initial position of The Warnock Report and of the 
prohibition of commercial surrogacy in the subsequent Surrogacy Arrangements Act, surrogacy in its 
altruistic form is allowed in the UK. 
Why would a country adopt different legislation for commercial and altruistic surrogacy? In treating 
altruistic and commercial surrogacy alike, the Italian legislator opted for a sharp condemnation of the 
practice of surrogacy itself. For the UK legislator it matters that in one case it is markets that organise 
surrogacies, and in the other case informal agreements that do not involve commodification. The 
significance of the distinction made by the UK legislation is the focus of this paper. What makes mar-
kets of surrogacy special? How is pregnancy different from other goods and services that are ex-
changed in the market? Is the market an appropriate institution to organise reproductive services? 
Pregnancy markets affect human well-being for two reasons essentially. Firstly, they affect several 
human relationships that we may (or may not) want to preserve. These relationships include the 
couple, the family and parenthood. Secondly, pregnancy-related reproductive services have so far 
been (and in the immediately foreseeable future will be) essentially gendered: pregnancies can only 
be carried out by female human beings. Women have been suffering from discrimination and male 
domination in most extant societies. Such domination and discrimination can be affected by how re-
production is organised, and indeed, the control of reproductive capacities has always been instru-
mental for the continuation of patriarchal power18. With commercial surrogacy, pregnancies become 
a segment of the reproductive market, and a form of what has been called ‘clinical labour’: this is ex-
pected to affect women's liberty and well-being19. 
                                                          
15
 Ibidem. p. 47 
16
 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. 
17
 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985; as of 1 October 2013, the HFEA updated the Code of Practice and the 
guidance notes of surrogacy agreements were affected. According to this updated version, the surrogate 
remains the legal mother upon birth, but if she is not married or in a civil partnership one of the intended 
parents can be the other legal parent of the child when born. CH(13)01. 
18
 C. PATEMAN, The Sexual Contract, Cambridge, 1988. 
19
 M. COOPER, C. WALDBY, Clinical Labor. Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy, Durham-
London, 2014. 
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The aim of this article is to provide a new perspective on this debate. Following Satz, we argue that 
the moral questions of commercial surrogacy need to be framed as questions pertaining to the ap-
propriate scope of markets (Section Three)20. In Section Four we review arguments in favour of 
commodification and explain why making commodification permissible ought to be taken as the de-
fault position. We then distinguish two different sets of challenges to the default position. Challenges 
based on the nature of pregnancy and the effects of its commodification on surrogates, babies and a 
number of social institutions that are allegedly worth-preserving are discussed in Section Five. Chal-
lenges based on issues of domination, exploitation and inequities towards women that depend on 
contextual factors, including economic inequalities and discrimination are the object of Section Six. In 
the same section, we argue that the first set of challenges fails to show that pregnancy should not be 
commodified. Instead, the second set of challenges captures some of the wrongs of commercial sur-
rogacy of paramount moral importance. However, it is our intention to show that these wrongs do 
not apply solely to reproductive labour; and that although pregnancy is not an exceptional form of 
labour, its moral saliency is due to labour being an exceptional commodity. We conclude by explain-
ing the advantages of this perspective in reasoning about policy, legislation and public debates on 
surrogate pregnancy. 
3. The debate on the scope of markets 
The moral issues surrounding gestational surrogacy have been discussed by a wide range of scholars, 
from philosophers21 to sociologists22 and legal experts23. A common framework adopted in English-
speaking moral and political philosophy constructs the normative questions pertaining surrogacy as 
questions on the appropriate scope of markets, ie. whether gestations are the sort of things that are 
appropriately bought and sold24. A broad swath of social history in the last century can be interpret-
ed as a struggle over the proper scope of commodification25. For instance, welfare states have been 
seen as de-commodification that makes a number of resources available to citizens irrespective of 
                                                          
20
 D. SATZ, Markets in women's reproductive labor, Philosophy & public affairs, 21/2, 1992, 107-131. 
21
 E. S. ANDERSON, Is women's labor a commodity?, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 72/3, 1990, 71-92 a). 
R.J. ARNESON, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, Philosophy & public affairs, 21/2, 1992, 132-164. 
S. WILKINSON, The exploitation argument against commercial surrogacy, Bioethics, 17/2, 2003, 169-187. 
22
 M. Cooper, C. Waldby, op. cit.  
23
 M. CRAWSHAW, E. BLYTH, O. VAN DEN AKKER, The changing profile of surrogacy in the UK–Implications for national 
and international policy and practice, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 34/3, 2012, 267-277. 
E.S. SCOTT, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, Law and Contemporary Problems 72/3, 2009, 109-
146. 
B.R. Sharma, op. cit. 
24
 R.J. Arneson, op. cit. 
C. PATEMAN, Op. cit. 
M.J. RADIN, Market-inalienability, Harvard Law Review, 100/8, 1987, 1849-1937. 
D. SATZ, Op. cit. 
E.S. SCOTT, Op. cit.  
25
 K. POLANYI, The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press, 1970;  
R.M. TITMUSS, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, New York: Pantheon Books, 1971. 
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their means26. The debate on surrogacy can be considered as another instance of this broader de-
bate. This is also the approach we take here. 
For the purpose of this paper, we define "commodity" as any good or service that is exchanged in a 
market. The concept of a market describes an ideal situation in which actors bargain on the price of a 
commodity as either producers or consumers. The price generated by such negotiation mediates be-
tween the competing interests of several buyers and sellers. Crucially, buyers and sellers respectively 
know how much (utility) they would gain from the commodity, and how much effort it takes to pro-
duce it. While extant markets are approximations of such an ideal, it is helpful to bear the model in 
mind for the discussion of the virtues and vices of markets. Markets are just one of several conceiva-
ble distributive institutions: others include families, networks of friends, political institutions, firms, 
etc. The tendency of Western societies during the last centuries has arguably been towards an ex-
tended marketisation of goods and services that were once produced, exchanged and distributed in 
different manners27. The effects of marketisation on human well-being depend partly on the institu-
tions that markets replace. Markets may replace undesirable institutions, and while this replacement 
is not a virtue of markets as such, commodification can sometimes be desirable in virtue of its disrup-
tive effects28. In the case of surrogacy, its repercussions for the structure of family, for instance in 
terms of genetic parenthood for homosexual couples, need to be analysed. 
In the next section, we will review several arguments in favour of commodification, explain their 
strengths and weaknesses, and show why making commodification permissible should be taken as 
the default position. 
4. The pro-commodification presumption: welfare, knowledge, liberty 
Pro-commodification arguments in the debate on surrogacy closely reflect the general virtues that 
markets are thought to possess: their welfare-enhancing properties, their efficient employment of 
local knowledge, and the protection they guarantee to individual freedom. 
 
Welfare. Prospective parents may find one of the few chances of parenthood and possibly the only 
chance of having genetically related offspring in surrogacy agreements. Homosexual couples and sin-
gle people have the opportunity to become parents even in countries where adoption is restricted to 
heterosexual couples. Despite the risk of overstressing genetic parenthood, the practice of surrogacy 
seems to protect an important interest of prospective parents, their interest in being a genetic par-
ent. At the same time, women of gestational age could benefit from this form of labour both socially 
and economically29. Surrogate labour is a uniquely female type of clinical labour, which may allow 
                                                          
26
 GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, I985. 
27
 K. POLANYI, op. cit. 
28
 One, possibly uncontroversial, example of emancipation through the expansion of markets may be the 
entrance of women in labour market in rich countries in the last decades of the XX century. The 
commodification of women labour force (including the outsourcing of household services that women had 
been providing within families) has been an important determinant of women’s liberty. 
29
 B. PARRY, May the surrogate speak?, OpenDemocracy, 2015a, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/bronwn-parry/may-surrogate-speak (last visited 26/04/2016). 
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women to take active part in market exchanges. Both authors that are wary of welfarist arguments 
and those who argue in favour of them agree on one point: even if women chose surrogate labour 
due to the absence of valuable alternatives, prohibiting surrogacy on these grounds would unduly 
harm the surrogates30. Even if a person would not carry out a pregnancy were her background condi-
tions better and her range of opportunities wider, prohibiting surrogacy inflicts a further harm upon 
her by barring a source of revenue which she finds attractive31. The mutual advantage of buyers and 
sellers is a general virtue of markets that pro-market theorists like to stress32. Although it does not 
trump other considerations, frustration of prospective parents and would-be surrogates’ interests is 
a cost that should be imputed to banning commercial surrogacy. 
 
Local knowledge. Bans on market exchanges frustrate buyers and sellers’ preferences. However, 
buyers and sellers are often irrational, and they may fail to reflect on their real interests. Arguments 
for commodification based on welfare are not conclusive chiefly for this reason. Yet there is a further 
problem with prohibition of market exchanges: they impede the employment of useful local 
knowledge. A poor woman who decides to carry out a pregnancy for others is often depicted as a vic-
tim of circumstance who is unable to make a real autonomous choice33. According to this narrative, 
she acts under psychological pressures due to poverty, and her preferences are unduly influenced by 
her condition. However, she is better placed than regulators in the evaluation of her opportunity 
costs and the relevant alternatives she has, including labouring in «poorly regulated sectors such as 
domestic service, toxic industries, or sex work, all of which are less economically rewarding and po-
tentially even more precarious and hazardous than surrogacy»34. This local knowledge would be 
wasted by the enactment of a ban on commercial surrogacy, i.e. such local knowledge will not be 
used to coordinate actions that may increase buyers and sellers’ well-being. 
 
Freedom. Markets leave ample sovereignty to individuals. Individual needs, wants and desires are 
what matters in market exchanges, and nothing more. Markets also satisfy the requirement of neu-
trality that prohibits fettering individual lives on the basis of partial views of what should be needed, 
wanted or desired. The exercise of individual sovereignty guaranteed by free markets is a further fea-
ture that appears in debates on surrogacy. The importance of preserving freedom of choice of surro-
                                                          
30
 B. PARRY, op. cit, (a). 
J.A. ROBERTSON, Surrogate mothers: Not so novel after all, Hastings Center Report, 13/5, 1983, 28-34 a). 
S. Wilkinson, op. cit.  
31
 A. WERTHEIMER, Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation, Philosophy & public affairs, 21/3, 1992, 211-
239. 
32
 Satz (1992) links pro-commodification arguments with fundamental theorems of welfare economics that 
show that markets are welfare-maximising. The clearing market-prices generate a distribution such that no 
other distribution can increase aggregate welfare without inflicting losses on at least some of the actors 
involved. The relationship between the theorem and virtues of real markets is however complex, as the 
theorem holds through for an all-encompassing market of goods and under very strict assumptions. 
33
 E. BAUMHOFER, Commodifying the Female Body: Outsourcing Surrogacy in a Global Market, Thinking Gender 
Papers, UCLA Conference, 2012, 1-23. 
E.S. Scott, op. cit. 
34
 B. PARRY, op. cit, (a). 
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gate mothers has often been defended35. To illustrate, banning or criminalising surrogacy is seen as 
undue restriction on women’s autonomy and an unjustified interference of the state on their repro-
ductive decisions based on partial views of what counts as appropriate reproductive behavior and 
motherhood. Feminist scholars have contrasting views on surrogacy36. Some feminist thinkers who 
have engaged with the debate on the moral issues of surrogacy defend this practice on the basis of 
respecting women’s rights to freedom and self-determination. The presumption in favour of freedom 
of choice of contemporary liberal societies and the struggles of feminist movements to grant women 
the freedom to dispose of their own bodies conflate here. These arguments are similar to those put 
forward in the context of assisted reproduction: procreative choices (including decisions of how, 
when and whether or not to reproduce) are considered by many to be among the most private 
choices that people make. For this reason, there exists a strong presumption in favour of liberty in 
this sphere, and against the limitation of this fundamental specification of freedom of choice37. 
 
The third set of arguments in favour of surrogacy is arguably sufficient to establish that permitting 
commercial surrogacy is the default moral position, which can be abandoned only if stronger argu-
ments are devised. The commitment to individual liberty poses a high justificatory burden on those 
who want to prohibit behaviours that do not harm others. In this case, while surrogacy is a pretty in-
vasive form of contractual exchange, as long as it involves consenting parties, there must be solid jus-
tifications for prohibition, and indeed for any interference38. There are other cases of bans on poten-
tially consensual commercial transactions: from the classical but somehow fanciful prohibition of sell-
ing oneselves as a slave, to the prohibition of selling votes. However, these cases do not make other 
prohibitions any less problematic, and one reason they are ‘classics’ in normative reasoning is pre-
cisely the difficulty involved in their rational vindication. Such presumption in favour of liberty also 
explains why commodification, albeit lamented, is seldom prevented. Markets are the result of free 
exchanges between individuals, and those committed to the protection of individual sovereignty are 
                                                          
35
 R. MACKLIN, Is there anything wrong with surrogate motherhood? An ethical analysis, The Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics, 16/1‐2, 1988, 57-64. 
C. Palacios-González, J. Harris, G. Testa, op. cit. 
J.A. Robertson, op. cit. (a) 
J.A. ROBERTSON, Children of choice. Freedom and the new reproductive technologies, Princeton, 1996b.  
36
 L.B. ANDREWS, Surrogate motherhood: the challenge for feminists, The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 
16/1‐2, 1988, 72-80. 
I. PETERSON, Baby M. trial splits ranks of feminists, The New York Times, 1987, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/24/nyregion/baby-m-trial-splits-ranks-of-feminists.html (last accessed: 
26/04/2016) 
E.S. SCOTT, op. cit. 
R. TONG, The overdue death of a feminist chameleon: Taking a stand on surrogacy arrangements, Journal of 
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ipso facto committed to the expansion of markets, if no stronger arguments can be put forward for 
interference. 
In the debate on surrogacy, there are two general strategies to argue for prohibition, or interference 
with surrogacy markets. One strategy rests on the effects of commodification of pregnancy on surro-
gates or other parties, which allegedly makes pregnancy special. This strategy aims to show that sell-
ing oneself as a surrogate is akin to slavery, or that it harms third parties: surrogate babies or, more 
unlikely, society at large. The second strategy aims to question the structural features of contempo-
rary societies that make surrogacy undesirable as it sustains or worsens forms of discrimination, 
domination and exploitation against women. We will show that these two strategies are profoundly 
dissimilar. The first set of arguments strives to support the view that pregnancy is not the sort of 
thing that should be commodified (we argue that the arguments put forward to support this view 
fail). The second set of arguments strives instead to support the view that pregnancy belongs to a 
broader category of services whose commodification is necessarily a site of conflict (we argue that 
these arguments are successful). 
5. Pregnancy is special 
Pregnancy may be a special service that should not be commodified because of its effects on moth-
ers, babies, society in general, or any combinations of the three.  
 
Surrogate mothers. Surrogacy may be exceptionally harmful to the surrogate from a physical, emo-
tional and existential point of view. One instance of emotional harm may be caused by the disruption 
of the relationship that the surrogate establishes with the foetus while it grows in her womb39. Ac-
cording to this view, the tie between the surrogate mother and the foetus she is carrying extends be-
yond the existence of genetic kinship and is part of a biological type of attachment to the future 
child. Moreover, emotional harm results from the repression of maternal feelings towards the foetus 
and from the disruption of the bond between the identity of a woman and her sexuality40. Some 
scholars employ the notion of alienation to describe the surrendering of the product of a surrogate’s 
labour to someone else41. Without denying that such separation may indeed be extremely harmful, 
the argument seems unduly paternalistic: as long as the surrogate consents to such psychological 
costs, there seems to be no ground to prohibit surrogacy agreements42. People do make psychologi-
cally painful decisions, including decisions pertaining to their relationships with other human beings, 
                                                          
39
 M. AGNAFORS, The harm argument against surrogacy revisited: two versions not to forget, Medicine, Health 
Care and Philosophy, 17/3, 2014, 357-363. 
40
 E.S. ANDERSON, op. cit. (a). 
J. OKSALA, Affective Labor and Feminist Politics, Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 41/2, 2016, 281-303. 
C. PATEMAN, op. cit. 
41
 E.S. ANDERSON, op. cit. (a). 
E.S. ANDERSON, Why commercial surrogate motherhood unethically commodifies women and children: reply to 
McLachlan and Swales, Health Care Analysis, 8/1, 2000, 19-26, b). 
A. VAN NIEKERK, ANTON, L. VAN ZYL, The ethics of surrogacy: women's reproductive labour, Journal of medical 
ethics, 21/6, 1995, 345-349. 
42
 G. DWORKIN, Defining Paternalism, in Coons and Weber (eds.), Paternalism: Theory and Practice, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2013, pp. 25–39. 
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for reasons related to their jobs. Even admitting that particular biological mechanisms underpin the 
bond between (gestational) mother and child, this is hardly exceptional. Bonds between relatives or 
between partners are equally grounded on robust mechanisms, and what seems to matter is wheth-
er the bond is deeply felt or not, rather than the nature of the mechanisms that sustain it. The aliena-
tion of the product of personal work is a widespread feature of working life: scholars surrender their 
manuscripts’ copyrights to editors, architects their projects to engineers and builders, and so on.  
In addition to psychological harm and alienation, surrogate labour is considered exceptional because 
it causes physical harm to the surrogate due to the long term kind of commitment that a pregnancy 
necessarily entails. Prior to the beginning of the pregnancy, the surrogate has to take medications, 
and during the pregnancy she will have to modify her habits and comply with societal and legal be-
havioural requirements for pregnant women. However, practically every job has long term physical 
consequences, and requires compliance with socially sanctioned behaviours. Professional athletes 
who endure extremely severe and physically damaging training sessions and have to follow certain 
dietary and behavioural obligations set by their clubs, are an often quoted example in this context. 
Even if the case of athletes may indeed be a quite extraordinary case and as such prove nothing in 
the case of surrogacy, effects on long term health are known for most clerk jobs. For instance, there 
is evidence that the health of employees with low control over their working tasks is damaged by the 
stress that it causes, and that their life expectancy is shortened as a result43.  
Moreover, there is a further problem with singling out reproductive work as a special kind of service, 
incomparable with other physical and psychological performances required in ordinary working life. 
Interferences with personal choices in the reproductive sphere may be more censurable than other 
paternalistic interferences, given the long standing harms to women that the patriarchal grip on fe-
male reproduction has generated. Feminist scholars have objected that it is unclear how one can be 
at the same time in favour of the legalisation of abortion, yet against surrogacy44. Indeed the argu-
ment that reproduction is a sui generis female service, and involves features of the female body that 
are of special concern for women’s identity, seems to describe a societal judgement that in the past 
has conveyed harmful suppressions of women. If anything, it would be desirable that surrogacy nor-
malises reproductive services. To repeat the point: such observations do not make surrogacy unprob-
lematic, exactly as analogous observations regarding the non-exceptionality of sex work would not 
make prostitution unproblematic. They only show that the problem lies elsewhere or the focus must 
be directed elsewhere. 
We have argued that there is nothing special in the psychological harms and alienation resulting from 
the severing of the surrogate-child tie, nor in the physical effects of pregnancy, nor in its particular 
relationship with women’s identity. However, others may be concerned that the commodification of 
the human body in the form of surrogacy expresses an intolerable attitude towards human life. 
There are two sides to this concern: one side pertains to the surrogate’s dignity, and is akin to the ar-
gument against slavery, the other pertains to the effects on society that such an attitude may have 
(and will be discussed below as it does not concern the surrogate as such). 
                                                          
43
 M. MARMOT, R. WILKINSON, eds. Social determinants of health, OUP Oxford, 2005, Ch.6. 
44
 L.B. ANDREWS, op. cit. 
E.S. SCOTT, op. cit.  
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According to this view, surrogates lose their dignity and are transformed into paid breeders and in-
cubators for men’s sperm45. The dignity argument is also reflected in legislation and advisory docu-
ments46 where surrogacy agreements are seen as harmful insofar as they violate the sacrality of 
pregnancy and reproduction, and transform women and reproductive labour in commodities. Most 
European countries such as Italy, France, Germany, Norway, etc. opted for a ban on surrogacy, mir-
roring the position taken on surrogacy in December 2015 in the Council of Europe’s ‘Annual Report 
on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s Policy on the Matter’. 
In the report, the EU took stand on human rights and possible actions to promote them. Among oth-
er topics, the Report addresses the Rights of Women and Girls47 and Article 114 condemns «the prac-
tice of surrogacy, which undermines the human dignity of the woman since her body and its repro-
ductive functions are used as a commodity; considers that the practice of gestational surrogacy 
which involves reproductive exploitation and use of the human body for financial or other gain, in 
particular in the case of vulnerable women in developing countries, shall be prohibited and treated 
as a matter of urgency in human rights instruments»48.  
Article 114 mentions some of the wrongs of surrogacy that will be discussed below, including exploi-
tation and the effects of vulnerability on the quality of personal choices. However, we have shown 
above that the use of the body and its reproductive functions as commodities is hardly unique, and 
treating it as such may indeed harm women. There are traces of instrumentalisation of human beings 
in surrogacy, but these are equally present in any other job where the capacity and physical powers 
of the worker are sold to other human beings that need them.  
The argument from dignity may have another source, namely the idea that surrogacy is degrading in 
a moral sense, i.e. it fails to treat surrogates as human beings should be treated, which echoes the 
Kantian imperative to treat persons not as means, but as ends in themselves. However, why would 
surrogacy be degrading? Prejudices and taboos surrounding reproduction are not valid reasons, and 
indeed, they harm women. Controversies over moral stands regarding other allegedly degrading ac-
tivities such as the so-called “dwarf tossing” show that it can be problematic to constrain one’s free-
dom on the basis of a supposedly degrading behaviour49.  
We believe that the harms discussed thus far do not single out surrogacy as a sui generis service that 
should be excluded from the market. As long as surrogacy agreements are voluntary, there are no 
reasons for prohibition. At the same time, prohibitions based on the alleged special nature of preg-
nancy may in turn damage women. However, if surrogacy harms third parties, the voluntary nature 
of such agreements is not enough to allow them. Surrogacy may, for instance, harm children. 
 
                                                          
45
 L.B. Andrews, op. cit. 
46
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, op. cit. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2014, 
2014. 
47
 EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, op. cit. Art 98 to 114. 
48
 EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, op. cit. Art 114. 
49
 G. DWORKIN, Moral Paternalism, Law and Philosophy, 2005, 24/3, 305–319. 
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Children. The same principle that is employed to condemn paternalism, the Millian Harm Principle, 
allows interference on the grounds of harms to third parties50. This may be another reason to ban 
surrogacy. 
Some scholars indissolubly link the commodification of women’s reproductive labour with the com-
modification of children51. Commercial surrogacy transforms children into commodities that can be 
bought and sold, thus losing their intrinsic value. In particular, English philosopher Anderson estab-
lishes a link between the commodification of children and the psychological distress that surrogacy 
agreements may inflict on them, as these agreements replace parental norms with market norms 
and property rights over children52. It is, however, helpful to keep the two issues distinct, i.e. com-
modification as such and the psychological consequences thereof. 
To start with, it is unclear how surrogacy agreements could be described as commodification of chil-
dren. Even if children are indeed bought and sold thanks to a surrogacy agreement, this does not 
necessarily make them a commodity in a morally objectionable sense. For instance, a surrogacy 
agreement does not make it possible for the adopting couple to resell the child. Whether or not a 
child is treated as property is not at stake here. Property is a complex concept, encompassing many 
different rights which any single property arrangement may or may not have (for instance, if one 
owns a listed building, one cannot tear it down). The question is whether or not the kind of rights 
that are given to surrogates and prospective parents over children are in any way harmful to them. 
To put it bluntly: even if surrogacy is a form of commodification of children, it does not equate with 
children being sold in supermarkets. The question is only whether replacing extant family norms 
(which again are themselves described as property norms by some theorists) with the particular 
property rights enshrined in surrogacy agreements harms children. 
This is a serious concern. Yet it is, to a large extent, an empirical question. While it is beyond the 
scope of this article to review the complex literature on the matter, which includes empirical litera-
ture on adoption, a few words of caution are in order. The replacement of extant reproductive insti-
tutions based on families with surrogacy should be treated cautiously, just as any profound modifica-
tion of established social habits and institutions should be treated cautiously. Established social hab-
its and institutions may be profoundly defective and morally objectionable, however, they are at 
least stable and provide continuity which is much needed for human life and is threatened if every-
thing is continuously to change53. This does not mean that extant institutions ought not to be ques-
tioned in virtue of their existence. The potential wrongs of family life are widespread and well-
known, and a cautious experimentalism in these matters seems to be the most balanced approach 
we can take. 
 
                                                          
50
 J.S. MILL, op. Cit. 
51
 E.S. ANDERSON, op. cit. (a). 
E.S. ANDERSON, op. cit. (b). 
M.J. RADIN, op. cit. 
D. SATZ, op. cit. 
52
 E.S. ANDERSON, op. cit. (b). 
53
 G.A. COHEN, A truth in conservatism: Rescuing conservatism from the conservatives, In O. Kazuhiro, Finding 
Oneself in the Other, Princeton, 2012. 
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Society. Polanyi argued that the expansion of market institutions to larger spheres of human life gen-
erates a reaction based on the myriad social relationships and human motivations which do not lend 
themselves to commodification54. The countermovement of society against market expansion is mo-
tivated by these alternative social and psychological foundations of human sociality. Perhaps com-
mercial surrogacy is just one step too far in the direction of commodification, as it pertains to a 
sphere of social life that human beings simply cannot bear to commodify. 
 A number of human relationships are simply not the sort of things that can be exchanged in mar-
kets55. A simple example is friendship: if you pay a person to be your friend, he is not your friend. In 
such cases, it is not just inappropriate to commodify a particular relationship: it is in a sense also im-
possible. Commodification erodes features of friendship relationships, especially gratuity, that are 
thought to be essential for its existence. One worry may be that the very existence of commercial 
surrogacy subtracts from the gratuitous quality of the majority of pregnancies that happen outside of 
commercial relationships. 
It may be hard to rationally make sense of these sorts of worries about commodification. They seem 
to signal a fundamental bias against changing the status quo, and in this case to the marketisation of 
reproductive institutions. A more general resistance to change does not make this sort of resistance 
against commodification any less relevant, as it may interfere with implementation of good policies 
or, on the contrary, sustain the enactment of forms of containment that are appropriate. However, 
some words of caution are again necessary. The claim that commodification is questionable because 
it jeopardises other forms of social relationships is dubious not only because these relationships may 
not be worth-preserving, but also because it may be, to a large extent, an excessive diagnosis. Bron-
wyn Parry criticises those anti-neoliberal attitudes that depict commodification as a force that leaves 
behind «a social desert of atomistic individuals warring against each other»56. Such analyses often 
overlook what actually happens around market exchange. They may find rich and inventive ways in 
which humans reconstruct forms of sociality that make sense of their action. In the case of surrogacy, 
this extends to the informal and sometimes friendly bonding that may be established between the 
surrogate and the prospective parents. This is, in one sense, another form of the Polanyian counter-
movement. 
 
Let us take stock of what we have argued, and what we have not argued, so far. We have shown that 
if there is anything that makes surrogacy special, it cannot be psychological and physical harm to sur-
rogates. Moreover, arguments that single out surrogacy as degrading are suspicious as they fail to 
show that they do not rely on assumptions regarding women’s sexuality and reproduction that have 
proven oppressive. Concerns with the well-being of children are of paramount importance and de-
serve further empirical scrutiny, and possibly experimentation. A good case for prohibition might be 
                                                          
54
 F. BLOCK, Polanyi’s Double Movement and the Reconstruction of Critical Theory, Interventions Économiques, 
38, 2008. 
55
 M.J. SANDEL, What money can’t buy: the moral limits of the market, London, 2012. 
M.J. RADIN, op. cit.  
56
 B. PARRY, Narratives of neoliberalism: ‘clinical labour’ in context, Medical humanities, 41/1, 2015, 32-37, (b). 
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constructed were harm to children is evidenced57. But this would not make surrogacy special with re-
gards to its commodification: the commercialisation of any social intercourse that harms third parties 
is a candidate for prohibition. 
Finally, reactions to the commodification of spheres of life that were hitherto organised on a differ-
ent basis do not offer guidance as such to the question whether pregnancy is the sort of thing that 
ought not to be commodified (albeit they are relevant for policy making). For these reasons we be-
lieve that there are no compelling arguments to make special exceptions to the default pro-
commodification position for surrogacy. 
What we did not argue, and what does not follow from our argument, so far is that surrogacy is mor-
ally unproblematic, that women cannot be seriously harmed by surrogacy, that the preferable legal 
and moral approach is its blanket liberalisation. All things considered, we believe that quite the op-
posite is true: surrogacy is not only a matter of moral disagreement, but it also represents a conflict-
ual reality, with weaker parties at risk of being abused, exploited and dominated. Yet such issues ex-
tend more generally to waged labour: we will argue below that asymmetries between sellers and 
buyers are endemic to the labour market, as the long tradition of labour decommodification reminds 
us. This is not to say that all forms of labour expose workers to the same danger, nor that there are 
no specific challenges that surrogacy poses. Instead, this is to say that the sort of exceptionality that 
makes surrogacy morally problematic is the kind of exceptionality that makes labour a special com-
modity. There are goods and services whose marketisation intrinsically brings up conflict: human la-
bour is this sort of thing. Again, whether or not marketisation in one place and at one point of history 
is considered emancipatory depends largely on what markets replace, but this does not exclude pe-
culiar issues that labour commodification raises. 
6. Labour is special 
A long standing social critique tradition poses that labour should not be commodified. There are sev-
eral interpretations of this claim, but they all stem from one concern about commodified labour, i.e. 
that labour markets are necessarily coercive. Indeed, the sale of labour has exceptional features that 
distinguish it from other market exchanges. Firstly, it always involves the very life of human beings, 
their bodies and their identity. This is peculiarly evident in the case of surrogate labour, but it is 
equally the case for other jobs. Secondly, most people depend on labour for their livelihood, i.e. they 
cannot sustain themselves without work. Such dependency places workers at a disadvantage with re-
spect to the buyer of their work. The buyer, i.e. the employer, can exercise command on the worker 
as a result of this dependency. Some Marxist authors believe that such domination is the ultimate 
                                                          
57
 The case is however not straightforward. There is disagreement over whether individuals can be wronged by 
the actions that caused their existence (see for instance Derek Parfit’s non-identity-problem in D. PARFIT, 
Reasons and persons, Oxford, 1984, Ch. 16 and its use in the context of the ethics of reproductive technologies 
in J.A. ROBERTSON, Procreative liberty and harm to offspring in assisted reproduction, American journal of law & 
medicine, 30/1, 2004, p. 7-40. 
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threat to freedom58. However, even if such domination is not a threat to freedom as such, it makes it 
possible for workers to be exploited and abused. 
What is the purpose of questioning the commodification of labour? The political aim of labour de-
commodification is to loosen the dependency of people from work. How this is achieved depends on 
the context, e.g. the technological framework or the available legal instruments. For instance, de-
commodification policies have supported the creation of new jobs (which makes workers scarce, 
thereby ameliorating their bargaining position) or the expansion of universal and unconditional wel-
fare services59. At present, the decommodification tradition has lost the widespread appeal that it 
once enjoyed. This happened partly due to an ideological decline, caused by the spread of different 
movements that actively campaigned for the equation of labour and other assets one may want to 
sell. Indeed, these movements claimed that labour is not exceptional after all60. But it is also a result 
of past victories of the decommodification camp. Still, the problem with work re-emerges as decom-
modification policies are torn apart, and in cases that capture the public imagination. We argue that 
commercial surrogacy is one of these cases. 
Legislations that make it unlawful to engage in commercial surrogacy, while allowing altruistic surro-
gacy, seem to be guided by the intuition that there is an intrinsic tension in surrogate labour. This 
tension does not lie within the practice of surrogacy itself, as we argued above, as is manifested in 
the permission of its altruistic form. The problem must be commodified labour, i.e. the concern that 
a woman may decide to carry out a pregnancy because she has no other valuable sources of subsist-
ence. This is an instance of the problem with work, i.e. the exceptionality of labour markets due to 
the fact that what is for sale is ultimately human power, and the dependency of workers from labour. 
There is a long standing tradition of feminism that is sensitive to the entanglement of gender issues 
and labour. One instructive argument is offered by Kathi Weeks and by her interpretation of the Ital-
ian feminist movement that campaigned for a salary for housework in the ‘70s. Weeks argues that 
such campaigns targeted the gendered distinction between reproductive and productive work rather 
than advocating expansion of the labour market to affective, care, and reproductive work. These 
feminists were contesting the distinction between the reproductive and productive sphere in order 
to question labour. By requesting a salary for housework, they were rather calling for detaching the 
means of subsistence from work: i.e. decommodification of work61. The distinction between repro-
ductive and productive works has since then subsided. Markets have expanded into spheres of social 
reproduction, affective work62, and mature economies switched to services. The question of work 
                                                          
58
 C. PATEMAN, The Sexual Contract, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1988, cit. In K. WEEKS, The 
Problem With Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork politics, and postwork imaginaries, Duke University Press, 
Durham and London: 2011. 
59
 The decommodification nature of welfare states refer is due to the fact that, by subtracting basic services 
from markets, they permit workers to survive independently from their salary, at least partially. Conditionality, 
i.e. the provision of services dependent on employment status, suspends such decommodification (see GOSTA-
ANDERSON, op. cit). 
60
 P. MIROWSKI, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go To Waste, London, 2014. 
61
 K. WEEKS op. cit., Ch. 3. 
62
 M. HARDT. Affective Labor, Boundary 2, 1999. 
J. OKSALA, op. cit. 
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has hence re-emerged as patterns of working, not working, and receiving a salary changed, but it also 
re-merged because technology now permits the outsourcing of parts of reproductive labour63. 
We argue that the problem of surrogacy is a manifestation of the more general problem with work. 
Challenges to the commodification of pregnancy and reproduction based on the exceptional nature 
of pregnancy do not capture the most problematic issues of surrogate labour. On the contrary, ques-
tions of domination of women, their exploitation and global inequalities should be the focus of the 
debate on the ethical issues of surrogate labour. However, in order to grasp how these contextual 
inequalities play out as morally problematic features of commercial surrogacy, it is of paramount im-
portance to engage with the more general problem with work, i.e that workers are dependent upon 
labour, and the more so the more they are disadvantaged. 
International surrogacy epitomises such contextual inequalities, and countries worldwide have 
adopted different legislation to regulate this practice. States that have more liberal legislation in 
terms of assisted reproduction, such as the UK, Canada and Australia, allow the practice of altruistic 
surrogacy while banning its commercial version. Among the few countries that permit commercial 
surrogacy, such as India, Russia, South Africa, and a few US states (e.g. California, Massachusetts), 
some have opted for the prohibition of international surrogacy, limiting this market to their own citi-
zens. The recent decision of the Indian government is telling in this respect: as of October 2015 the 
Indian government followed the request of two Supreme Court justices and banned commercial sur-
rogacy services to foreign nationals64. In countries where surrogacy is banned, travelling to benefit 
from the more liberal legislation of other states has become a known phenomenon. For instance, 
many Italian couples turn to other countries such as the United States, India or the United Kingdom 
in which surrogate services are not prohibited65. 
Advocates to liberal approaches to international surrogacy maintain that the prohibition of this prac-
tice is counterproductive and may even be vain. It is counterproductive because it prevents some 
women, and their families, from accessing a reliable source of income. It is vain because a restrictive 
legislation in country A would likely result in the migration of sellers to the more liberalised country 
                                                          
63
 M. COOPER, C. WALDBY, op. cit. 
64
 B. PARRY, Op. cit. (a). 
Express News Service, No commercial surrogacy, only for needy Indian couples, Govt tells SC, The Indian 
Express, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/govt-to-make-commercial-surrogacy-
illegal-panel-to-decide-on-cases-of-infertile-couples/ (last accessed: 26/04/2016). 
A. RABINOWITZ, Paying for the baby: the trouble with renting a womb, The Guardian, 2016 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/apr/28/paying-for-baby-trouble-with-renting-womb-
india?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other (last accessed: 28/04/2016). 
65
 This form of medical tourism was firstly named by Knoppers and LeBris “procreative tourism” (see B.M. 
KNOPPERS & S. LEBRIS, Recent advances in medically assisted conception: legal, ethical and social issues, American 
Journal of Law & Medicine, 17, 1991, 329-360) and describes a phenomenon whereby citizens travel from one 
country where a reproductive service is not available to another with less restrictive legislations in order to 
obtain the kind of reproductive service they desire (G. PENNINGS, Reproductive tourism as moral pluralism in 
motion, Journal of medical ethics, 28/6, 2002, 337-341). 
In a recent survey (2012) the Italian institute “Osservatorio sul turismo procreativo” (“Reproductive tourism 
watch”) has found that only in 2011 over 30 Italian couples travelled to countries in which surrogate 
agreements are permitted (see G. SERUGHETTI, Mamme mie!, Leggendaria, 115, 7-10). 
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B66. Interestingly, the rhetoric employed by the opponents of robust regulations of labour markets 
echoes this position. Such strategic arguments, however, do not resolve the problem with commodi-
fied labour: in the extant conditions, these may well be the best policy solutions, but they do not 
make surrogacy a win-win solution that equally promotes the interests of all parties. Moreover, de-
picting it as such is counterproductive in policy-making as it may harm the weaker parties. 
One such depiction is sociologist Bronwyn Parry’s contention that «many of the gendered and racial-
ised accounts that we encounter regarding surrogates also act to prevent marginalised or poorer 
women from occupying the role of benefactor to women of a more privileged class»67. The view of 
surrogacy contracts as mutually advantageous and even philanthropic is indeed a refreshing alterna-
tive to paternalist accounts of surrogacy, which Parry calls “narratives of neoliberalism” (i.e. anti-
neoliberal accounts). However, the philanthropic account of surrogate labour hides the conflictual 
nature of commodified work, and in fact it does not stand in this case when extrapolated to other 
jobs: all privileged employers are in need of benefactors of one kind or another, that is, they need to 
hire employees. 
In what sense is this perspective different from paternalistic narratives of neoliberalism? Many social 
scientists have pointed out the contextual inequalities that affect commercial surrogacy. However, 
without reference to the general problem of work, their normative assessment has to rely on the 
view that poorer women who decide to become surrogates are victims whose agency is curtailed by 
social circumstances, and whom should be protected by enlightened legislators or social activists. 
Bronwyn Parry argues that such approaches fail to treat women appropriately, and disregard their 
capacity for agency. On the basis of her fieldwork (interviewing surrogate mothers in India), she ar-
gues that poor women are capable of autonomous agency and that the ways in which surrogates 
make sense of their choices are of paramount importance and should not be dismissed as false con-
sciousness68. However, such a critique does not apply to the perspective advanced here. Any mini-
mally sophisticated gendered and racialised account of surrogate labour is not merely a philanthropic 
cry of pain for the condition of vulnerable groups, but a description of structural inequalities that 
play out to affect the liberty and well-being of women in labour markets, including the surrogacy 
market. 
7. Conclusions 
We have argued that the exceptionality of commercial surrogacy lies not so much on its surrogacy 
side, i.e. pregnancy, but on its commercial side, i.e. labour. Legislation that prohibits commercial sur-
rogacy but permits altruistic surrogacy implicitly endorses free labour over commodified labour. 
What makes altruistic surrogacy unproblematic is that which would make any work uncoerced, i.e. 
the independency of workers from their salary. Altruistic surrogacy would be better addressed as 
free surrogacy: a form of labour that is not coerced because survival is not among the motivations for 
carrying it out. 
                                                          
66
 See supra note 65. 
67
 B. PARRY, op. cit. (a). 
68
 B. PARRY, op. cit. (b). 
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This perspective is not meant to vindicate prohibitions of commercial surrogacy. Whether such legis-
lation is desirable is largely an empirical question, which should also address whether altruistic sur-
rogacy would become a cover for what is, in the end, commercial surrogacy in disguise. Despite such 
indeterminacy with respect to policy, our perspective has several distinct advantages in comparison 
to other analyses. Anti-commodification exceptionality arguments based on the nature of pregnancy 
may feed attempts to re-naturalise reproduction, thus lending legitimacy to oppressive conceptions 
of the social role of women. Whereas pro-commodification non-exceptionality arguments may in-
stead foster an undue optimism towards reproductive labour markets, thus concealing the conflictual 
nature and the wrongs of reproductive labour. Our argument, that what makes commercial surroga-
cy morally problematic is what makes any commodified work problematic, avoids these two pitfalls. 
It recognises the liberating aspects of markets, which equalise the sphere of human reproduction to 
other spheres, thereby disrupting views on the sacrality of reproduction that have beset women´s 
freedom in patriarchal societies. But it also does not buy into the narratives according to which sur-
rogacy is just one of the many types of market exchange, explaining wrongs to women due to ine-
qualities and discrimination without reference to paternalistic accounts of what makes such struc-
tures questionable. That is, it explains why contextual inequalities matter morally in discussions 
about surrogacy, without committing to the view that surrogates are victims, that their agency is cur-
tailed, that they are not in a position to make choices that correspond with their life plans and pro-
mote their interests. 
Within feminist thought, there are harsh discussions on commercial surrogacy. Some activist groups 
are vehemently opposed to it. In their opinion, surrogacy may well liberate women from the patri-
arch, but it delivers them to the market69. Others caution that such opposition, if conducted on the 
basis of the exceptional nature of pregnancy and the special significance of pregnancy for women, 
might reinforce oppressive conceptions of the role of women. Our perspective cuts through these 
views: they are both partially right, but the problem lies elsewhere, namely in the manners in which 
contextual inequalities impact on labour markets, any labour market. 
The labour decommodification perspective also enlightens broader social debates pertaining to the 
proper scope of markets. There has been a post-economic crisis revival of reflections on the founda-
tions, values and consequences of coordinating an ever larger number of social exchanges through 
markets. Critiques come from disparate traditions, and merge political discourses that are often 
thought of as fiercely opposed. The debate on surrogacy offers a telling instance of these mergers. 
Conservatives and communitarians, preoccupied with the subversive effects of marketisation, pair up 
with socialists concerned with domination; liberal progressives that may oppose neo-liberalism in so-
cial policy find themselves with right-libertarians under the banner of individual sovereignty. The po-
sition of the Catholic Church on surrogacy is perhaps paradigmatic in blending the two strands of an-
ti-commodification arguments as it claims that such practice is unnatural, while cautioning against 
«the exploitation and commercialization of the female body»70. The labour decommodification per-
spective separates these different strands of anti-commodification arguments, thereby highlighting 
the strategic risks incurred by activists concerned with the effects of markets on domination and ex-
                                                          
69
 See: http://www.cheliberta.it/2015/10/29/utero-in-affitto-noi-diciamo-no/ (last accessed: 24/04/2016). 
70
 Amoris laetitia, op. cit. §54. 
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ploitation that believe anti-commodification sentiments based on communitarian or conservative be-
liefs can be employed without committing to their oppressive sides. 
One final noteworthy feature of the perspective that we have presented pertains to its reach. The 
argument that labour, not surrogacy, is exceptional, entails that these issues are encountered wher-
ever there are structural inequalities and commodified labour. Whether this is a useful perspective is, 
necessarily, going to be controversial. 
